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Abstract 
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I. Introduction 
The fiscal stimulus packages contemplated or enacted in many countries from 2009 onwards to 
combat the global economic crisis typically included significant expansions in various public 
expenditure programs. Much debate surrounded the merits of these fiscal packages, not least with 
respect to the wisdom of attempts, and governments’ ability, to stimulate the economy via 
expenditure injections. The specific public spending choices in these short-term fiscal packages 
were motivated in part by a desire to be consistent with these governments’ long-term growth 
objectives, such as expanding infrastructure spending which was perceived as benefiting long-
run GDP levels or growth rates. This brings to the fore, the twin questions of how strong is the 
evidence-base that long-run income levels or growth rates respond to public expenditure changes, 
and which expenditure categories have greatest impact? 
This paper focuses on these two questions; it does not deal with whether there are short-run 
benefits from such stimulus packages, which requires quite different analytics and empirical 
methodologies. We first briefly review the relevant theory. This builds on Barro (1990) and 
Devarajan et al. (1996) who proposed that so-called ‘productive’ public expenditures can 
influence long-run growth rates via impacts on private sector production functions. Following a 
brief discussion of the existing evidence on the long-run public expenditure-output relationships, 
we provide more systematic empirical evidence than available hitherto for OECD countries. 
There are a number of reasons to re-examine this issue. Firstly, most empirical studies focus 
on a subset of individual expenditure categories, such as defence, education or transport and 
communication expenditures. These have produced a mixed set of findings and do not typically 
allow the trade-offs between different forms of public expenditure to be identified explicitly. Our 
approach provides evidence on these trade-offs. 
Secondly, a number of recent papers have used alternative methodologies to examine long-
run impacts of tax policy on GDP levels or growth rates (see Adam and Bevan, 2005; Lee and 
Gordon, 2005; Romero-Avila and Strauch, 2008; Arnold et al, 2011; Gemmell et al., 2011, 
2014). However, public expenditure is rarely the primary focus of attention in these studies, or it 
is tested as an aggregate ‘productive’ spending category. In this paper we limit attention to 
potential effects of public expenditure on long-run GDP levels, but we focus both on total public 
expenditure (suitably financed via the government budget constraint) and on how long-run GDP 
levels may be differentially affected by specific functional spending categories. 
Thirdly, difficulties dealing with endogeneity associated with estimates of fiscal impacts of 
on GDP, have afflicted most previous studies. While we do not claim to have resolved these 
concerns in this paper, we do carefully address potential endogeneity problems. Our estimated 
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fiscal-GDP parameters would appear to be at least ‘weakly exogenous’ (based on standard 
econometric definitions, see Johansen, 1992, and Boswijk, 1995). 
Fourthly, increased use of panel methods and datasets has increased the reliability of recent 
studies. However, the generally short time-series dimensions of these panels have led to fixed 
effects estimators, which impose parameter homogeneity, typically being used. Furthermore, as 
Haque’s (2004) re-examination of the Devarajan et al (1996) results shows, how the time-series 
properties of the data are handled can be crucial for estimated output effects of fiscal variables. 
In this paper, access to an extended panel dataset with a longer time dimension than previous 
studies, permits application of the more flexible Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator proposed 
by Pesaran et al. (1999). This enables us to explore both short-run dynamics and long-run 
equilibrium relationships among the variables of interest, account for heterogeneity across 
countries in their short-run dynamic relationships. We compare these results with those obtained 
using more restrictive dynamic fixed effects (DFE) methods, and the more flexible, but 
information-intensive, Mean Group (MG) approach. 
These improvements provide more robust evidence on the potential long-run association and 
causation between public spending and GDP. This supports some traditional views, such as that 
a spending reallocation towards infrastructure and education spending (and to a lesser extent, 
health) can raise GDP over the long-run. Our results also suggest that, relative to public spending 
‘on average’, social welfare spending may have moderate GDP-reducing effects. That is, there is 
likely to be a trade-off between public spending aimed at income redistribution (via social welfare 
spending) and that aimed at raising overall income levels. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section II briefly describes the links 
between public expenditure composition and GDP growth hypothesised by recent theory, and 
summarises current evidence for OECD countries. Section III then discusses our testing 
methodologies and dataset; while section IV reports results for a sample of 17 OECD countries 
over 1972-2008. Some conclusions are drawn in section V. 
II. Public spending, taxes and growth 
Theory 
As is well known, in the neoclassical growth model, if the incentives to save or to invest in new 
capital are affected by fiscal policy, this alters the equilibrium capital-output ratio, and therefore 
the level of the output path, but not its slope. There are effects on growth only for a transitional 
period as the economy moves onto its new output path, though the length of this transition 
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remains subject to debate.1There is, however, a resulting impact on the long-run level of output 
(GDP). The 1990s saw the development of a number of growth models with a permanent, or at 
least persistent, role for fiscal policy such as those of Barro (1990), Futagami et al. (1993) and 
Deverajan et al. (1996). 
A novel feature of these models was that fiscal policy can determine both the level of the 
output path and the steady-state (long-run) growth rate.2 Key fiscal policy aspects include that 
some ‘productive’ public expenditures affect the productivity of the private sector while other 
‘unproductive’ expenditures only impact on citizens’ welfare (including the possibility of zero 
welfare effects), and that some taxes levied to fund public expenditures distort investment 
decisions. In a model with multiple productive expenditures Devarajan et al. (1996) show that 
the long-run growth effects depend upon a combination of the relative productivities of these 
expenditures and their relative budget shares. 
As Kneller et al. (1999) show, the categorising of public expenditures into ‘productive’ and 
‘unproductive’, and taxes into ‘distortionary’ and ‘non-distortionary’ (with respect to investment 
decisions) yields predicted long-run growth impacts from fiscal policy that depend on these 
decompositions. Positive, negative or zero effects are each possible depending on the 
tax/expenditure combinations chosen. When the above models are extended to allow for the 
growth effects of deficits/surpluses, outcomes are again positive, negative or ambiguous 
depending on what the deficit is financing; see Adam and Bevan (2005), Gemmell et al. (2011). 
A number of recent papers have modelled the relationship between particular public 
spending categories and growth. In a series of papers, Agénor and Neanidis (2006) and Agénor 
(2008) have examined various extensions of the Barro/Devarajan framework which explicitly 
model (i) infrastructure, education and/or health spending as inputs into private production; and 
(ii) interactions between these spending types, for example, by allowing the supply of health 
services or infrastructure spending to enter into the production function for education. 
In a similar vein, Semmler et al. (2007) develop an endogenous growth model to consider 
the output effects of these three types of spending, in which the tax rate is assumed to be chosen 
optimally. They solve the model numerically and calibrate it to explore the impact of shifts 
between public investment in infrastructure assets that directly influence market production and 
public investment devoted to the production of human capital accumulation (education and 
                                                        
1On fiscal response dynamics see, for example, Turnovsky (2004) who estimates ‘transitional’ output adjustments to 
fiscal policy changes in terms of decades. Lee et al.’s (1997) analysis of convergence, on the other hand, finds 
convergence speeds to equilibrium could be as rapid as 2-3 years. 
2 Not all endogenous growth models predict long-run growth effects from fiscal policy. These have sometimes been 
labelled ‘semi-endogenous’ or ‘non-scale’ growth models; see Eicher and Turnovsky (1999). 
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health). Blankenau and Simpson (2004) propose a different model of the relationship between 
public education expenditures and growth. They show that the relationship need not be 
monotonic when account is taken of tax-financing methods (analogously to Barro) and the 
specification of the technology of human capital production (e.g. how public and private inputs 
into human capital formation, and the input of human capital from preceding generations, are 
combined)3. 
Each of the above models hypothesises mechanisms by which permanent impacts on GDP 
growth rates can occur in association with changes in particular public expenditure categories, 
especially those related to infrastructure and human capital production. Of course as is well 
known, such endogenous growth models depend for their ‘permanent’ growth effects on the so-
called ‘knife-edge’ properties whereby these permanent growth effects depend on exactly 
constant returns to scale (Solow, 1994; Dalgaard and Kreiner, 2003). While the conditions for 
such permanent effects may be restrictive, and hard to verify empirically, they do point to the 
possibility that output effects from public spending changes could be highly persistent. 
Existing empirical evidence on public expenditure and growth 
Much of the empirical literature testing for fiscal policy impacts on long-run GDP levels or 
growth rates has focused on taxes rather than public expenditures, and it suffers from various 
methodological weaknesses.4 In particular it is now recognised that tests of the output effects of 
public expenditure decompositions (and other fiscal variables) must accommodate the total 
government budget (expenditures, revenues, deficits); a feature missing from much of the earlier 
literature. 
As shown by Kneller et al. (1999), without accounting for the government budget constraint 
(GBC), evidence on the long-run output effects of public expenditures including total public 
expenditures is difficult to interpret and non-robust. However, where specific decompositions 
have been examined, education, health and/or transport & communication (T&C) spending have 
sometimes been shown to be positively associated with GDP growth – usually obtained from 
data covering 2-3 decades. For example, the meta-analysis of Nijkamp and Poot (2004), which 
covers many studies using a variety of methodologies, finds evidence of strong GDP growth 
                                                        
3 Albertini et al. (2014) examine the short-run fiscal multipliers for different components of government spending 
at the zero lower bound. These authors calibrate a simple new Keynesian model and show that the multiplier at the 
zero lower bound is smaller when government spending is productive or when consumption and government 
purchases are substitutable. 
4 See Slemrod (1995), Tanzi and Zee (1997), Myles (2000) for earlier, more detailed reviews and Temple (1999) for 
a more wide-ranging review of growth empirics. 
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associated with higher education and infrastructure spending.5 Nevertheless a general failure to 
incorporate the GBC in prior empirical estimates and a tendency to focus on specific spending 
categories while ignoring others, limits the reliability and generality of this evidence. Alfonso 
and Jalles (2014), for example, focus on social security and welfare, education and health, finding 
a negative impact for the first type of government spending and positive impact for the last two 
in a large sample of developing and developed countries. 
Acosta-Ormaechea and Morozumi (2013) analyse the impact of five functions (transport and 
communications, defence, education, health and social protection) on growth for a sample of 56 
low, middle and high income countries. They acknowledge the GBC by examining the impact of 
an increase in an expenditure component at the cost of each of the other four components 
analysed. They find that only education spending has growth-enhancing effects that are 
statistically significant. This happens specifically when an increase in education spending is 
financed by a fall in health or social protection spending. Teles and Mussolini (2014) incorporate 
the GBC and find, again for a mixed sample of developing and developed countries, that 
productive spending affects economic growth positively, but that this impact lowers as the public 
debt increases.  Gemmell et al. (2011) focus on the impact of taxes and aggregated ‘productive’ 
and ‘unproductive’ public spending categories on OECD growth rates, using annual data over 3-
4 decades. Their analysis highlights timing and persistence aspects of these relationships, 
however, and does not address the relationships between more detailed spending categories and 
long-run GDP levels or growth rates. 
Similarly, Arnold et al. (2011) have examined the relationships between tax decompositions 
(personal income, corporate income, consumption and property taxes) and long-run GDP levels 
in the OECD and found that, not only is there evidence of long-run GDP level effects from some 
tax types, but that the way in which the GBC is captured in the regression specification affects 
interpretation of resulting parameter estimates, as argued by Kneller et al.(1999).6 
An advantage of the ‘levels specification’ adopted by Arnold et al. (2011) is that it allows 
the data to identify the degree of persistence within the fiscal policy-GDP growth response, rather 
than impose a functional form derived from endogenous growth models embodying permanent 
effects. Below we adopt the Arnold et al. (2011) approach but adapted for public expenditure 
decompositions rather than taxes. 
                                                        
5 They do not find strong evidence for fiscal variables in general however, which is again not surprising given the 
mixture of positive and negative effects expected for many fiscal aggregates, depending on composition and 
financing methods. 
6 Some of this evidence has been challenged by Xing (2011). 
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III. Methodology and data 
Growth versus level effects 
The empirical specification adopted by much of the empirical literature testing for public 
expenditure-GDP growth effects since Devarajan et al. (1996) is based on their endogenous 
growth model. Derived from the Barro (1990) framework, this model essentially generates an 
estimating equation in which the long-run (proxying the steady-state) growth of GDP in country 
i at time t is a function of the ratio of total government expenditure, E, to GDP and a vector of 
shares of j individual categories within total government expenditure, ej. Sets of conditioning 
variables, consistent with a more general growth model or more pragmatic considerations, are 
often included; see Devarajan et al. (1996; p.322). When applied in a panel context, the 
Devarajan et al. endogenous growth model takes the form: 
     variablescontrol ... // ,,,1,, tititik
k
ktititi EEYEyg     (1) 
where yit is the log of GDP per capita in country i at time t, git is the growth rate (log difference: 
ity ), Y is GDP, E is total public expenditure and Ek is the k
th expenditure component, i and t 
are country and time fixed effects, and it is a classical error term.7  
A difficulty with equation (1) is that it is specific to the endogenous growth model with 
permanent growth effects of fiscal policy and no transitional dynamics. To allow for the 
possibility of non-permanent but potentially persistent Solow-type transitional dynamics as 
described above requires a more flexible functional form, particularly when working with annual 
data where mean reversion is likely to be important. We follow Arnold et al. (2007, 2011) and 
use an autoregressive distributed lag, ARDL(p, q), model, parameterised in error correction 
form.8 This allows both the short-run dynamic and the long-run equilibrium relationships 
between GDP and fiscal variables to be separately identified. 
Consider the following general ARDL(p, q) specification: 
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑗𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝
𝑗=1
+ ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖 +
𝑞
𝑗=0
𝜀𝑖,𝑡 
and 
∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡 = 1∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−1 + 2∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−2 + … + 𝑠∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑠 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡 
                                                        
7 The dependent variable in some cases is per capita GDP growth, which simply involves a re-parameterisation 
when GDP is on the left-hand side, and the vector of control variables includes a measure of population growth on 
the right-hand side. 
8Arnold et al. (2007) show that such a specification can be consistent with, and nest, alternative augmented Solow 
and (Uzawa-Lucas) endogenous growth models. 
(2.1) 
(2.2) 
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where the vector Xi,t in (2.1) includes both the fiscal variables of interest (e.g. the level and mix 
of expenditures, E/Y and Ek/E respectively), and control variables. The , , and are parameters 
to be estimated; where the s capture the autoregressive process in Xi,t. 
A number of parameterisations of (2.1) are possible (see Wickens and Breusch, 1988, for 
discussion), but it is readily shown that (2.1) can be rearranged in error correction (ECM) form 
to become: 
𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑖(𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 − 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖,𝑡) + ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑗
∗ ∆𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑗
𝑝−1
𝑗=1 + ∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗
∗ ∆𝑋𝑖,𝑡−𝑗 + 𝜇𝑖 +
𝑞−1
𝑗=0 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (3) 
where
𝑖
= −(1 − ∑ 𝛼𝑖,𝑗)
𝑝
𝑗=1  captures the error correcting component, and 𝛽𝑖 = (∑ 𝛽𝑖,𝑗/𝑖)
𝑞
𝑗=0  
captures the long-run equilibrium relationships between y and X, with short-run effects measured 
by 𝛽𝑖,𝑗
∗  – the parameters associated with the X variables in (3). The error correction term,i, is a 
measure of the speed at which the model returns to equilibrium after a shock to exogenous 
variables. Equation (3) allows i, and i, to vary across countries, though alternative econometric 
approaches (PMG, MG, DFE etc.) involve differing homogeneity restrictions, as discussed 
further below. 
The degree of persistence of any fiscal effects on output growth in the model is, of course, 
determined by the model’s convergence properties.9 Note that, although the per capita GDP 
growth rate, gi,t, appears on the left-hand side of (3), this regression captures the impacts of fiscal 
and other variables on the long-run level, not the growth rate, of GDP, since (3) is merely a re-
parameterisation of (2.1). 
The government budget constraint 
Because the GBC describes a ‘closed system’, whether forms such as (2.1) or (3) are adopted, 
the estimating equation needs to recognise that expenditures, Ei,t, must be financed by revenues, 
Ri,t, and/or the budget surplus/deficit, Di,t, each with potential output effects, since ititit ERD   
(see Kneller et al., 1999; Gemmell et al., 2011). As a result, in addition to the variables E/Y and 
(E/Y) within the vectors X and X in (3), we should think of (R/Y) and (D/Y) as also potentially 
having effects on output with any net output effect depending on the particular ‘financing’ 
combinations assumed. Hence a decomposition of iXi,t in equation (3) includes (setting i =  
for convenience): 
        .... / /// ...
1,k4,1,31,21,1   
k
tiktititi
EEYDYRYE   (4) 
                                                        
9 Though the parameter  can be interpreted as a speed of adjustment, it is not equal to the more familiar rate of 
conditional convergence in this model. With short-run dynamics included here, the convergence rate varies both 
over time and across countries. 
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and similarly for the short-run output effects of expenditures, revenues and deficits, captured 
within an equivalent decomposition of Xi,t-1 in (3). However, since introducing all three 
variables would be perfectly collinear in a regression, one may be chosen arbitrarily to omit. 
Omitting (D/Y)i,t-1, (4) becomes: 
      .... / /)(  /)(  ...
1k4,1,321,31   
k
itktiti
EEYRYE   (5) 
This demonstrates the correct interpretation of the output effects of expenditure and revenue 
variables, within this model. Estimates of the fiscal parameters in (5) capture the effects of 
increases in total expenditure, or decreases in revenues, financed by changes in the budget deficit 
(the omitted category in this example). These effects can be seen to depend on the signs and 
relative sizes of , and. In comparison, the interpretation of the coefficients on the 
individual expenditure share components of interest, 4,k, remains unaffected. It measures the 
effect on GDP of a change in the share of spending on each category holding constant the other 
variables in equation (5) including total expenditure. 
In the applications below, each regression includes one of the k = 1…K expenditure share 
elements, Ek/E, where the included k
th expenditure category is rotated across the K different 
categories. Including each expenditure share in turn (rather than all K-1 expenditure shares 
simultaneously) saves on degrees of freedom in our panel regression model which requires a 
large number of parameters to be estimated due to the assumption of short-run parameter 
heterogeneity across countries; see below. 
By repeating regressions on equation (3) but including a different expenditure category each 
time (from (5)), it can be shown that the per capita GDP impacts of a bilateral switch between 
any two expenditure categories, l and m, can be obtained. This uses the property of derivatives 
whereby, 𝑑𝐸𝑙/𝑑𝐸𝑚 = (𝑑𝐸𝑙/𝑑𝐸)/(𝑑𝐸𝑚/𝑑𝐸)  and the fact that total expenditure is held constant 
in these regressions. It can be shown that the output effect associated with a switch between two 
expenditure shares l and m, is a form of weighted sum of relevant l and m where the s are 
obtained from the relevant versions of regressions on equation (3) – including (El/E) and (Em/E) 
respectively. 
Allowing for heterogeneous fiscal-output effects 
We estimate an equation of the form in (3) above using the pooled mean group (PMG) 
methodology of Pesaran et al. (1999), and compare this with the equivalent results using fixed 
effects (FE), and mean group (MG), estimators. The PMG estimator provides a useful 
intermediate alternative between estimating separate regressions for each country (the MG case) 
and the fixed effects estimator which imposes homogeneity on all slope coefficients and error 
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variances across countries. The PMG estimator allows the intercepts, short-run coefficients and 
error variances to differ freely across groups, but constrains the long-run coefficients to be the 
same. 
Acceptance of homogeneity of the long-run responses implies that the results from the PMG 
estimator are more efficient than those from the alternative MG estimator which permits long-
run heterogeneity. Pesaran et al. (1999) demonstrate that the PMG’s short-run parameter 
heterogeneity yields more reliable estimates of the long-run responses, and can affect estimated 
speeds of convergence towards long-run equilibrium. 
A disadvantage of the PMG estimator is that, unless the available time series are long, a 
degrees of freedom problem is soon reached. For the dataset available here this requires some 
restrictions on lag lengths and/or the set of right-hand-side (RHS) variables. For this reason we 
restrict the RHS variables to include each expenditure category (share) separately in turn, with 
up to 2 lags. Though this lag length is relatively short, inclusion of the lagged dependent variable 
ensures that adjustment to equilibrium can be highly persistent. 
We also include two non-fiscal control variables –the private non-residential investment rate, 
and employment growth. These variables appear in many empirical growth models capturing the 
role of private sector inputs. Also, recognising that some public expenditures may impact on 
GDP partially through their impact on private investment, we omit the latter variable from some 
specification to explore this possibility. 
An important aspect of equation (3) when testing for the output effects of public expenditures 
is that it allows for the degree of persistence of these effects to differ across expenditure types, 
at least to the extent that these can be captured by the 30+ years of our data. In addition, though 
we initially adopt the PMG assumption of long-run parameter homogeneity across countries, we 
also test this against the mean group (MG) and fixed effects (FE) alternatives with a Hausman 
test. 
Addressing endogeneity 
A major concern when running regressions of the form in (3) is , of course, the potential for 
simultaneity between GDP per capita and the right-had-side variables - especially the fiscal and 
investment variables (a point stressed by Slemrod (1995) in a cross-section growth regression 
context). In addition, country-specific, time-varying factors such as changes to political and 
institutional settings may influence both fiscal policy and GDP per capita, and which are not 
adequately captured by time fixed effects. These effects may be compounded by persistence in 
the annual fiscal series and potentially long lags in the impacts of fiscal variables on GDP per 
capita, generating serial correlation in the error process that must be dealt with adequately. As a 
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result the fiscal variables of interest here may be endogenous, with well-known problems of 
interpretation of the short-and long-run OLS parameters. 
In a series of papers in the mid-1990s, Pesaran and associates (see, for example, Pesaran and 
Smith, 1995; Pasaran, 1997; Pesaran and Shin, 1999) demonstrated that, under a number of 
conditions, estimates of the long-run parameter vector, , from OLS regressions of models such 
as (3),are consistent.10 Further, based on simulation results, Pesaran et al. (1999) demonstrate 
that even in small samples standard t- and F-tests on the long-run parameters from the ECMs are 
valid, given suitable specification of the lag structures of dependent and independent variables.11 
Further, where serial correlation is a concern, ‘appropriate modification of the orders of the 
ARDL model’ (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.386) is sufficient to deal with both the serial correlation 
in the error process and/or regressor endogeneity (see also Kanas and Kouretas, 2005). We 
discuss these aspects further in section IV when we present our empirical results. 
The updated dataset 
Results reported below are based on an extension of the Bleaney et al. (2001) dataset, which uses 
the IMF’s Government Financial Statistics (GFS) fiscal data for 17 OECD countries to construct 
measures of total expenditure and individual expenditure shares, distortionary and non-
distortionary taxes, and budget surpluses/deficits.12 The original data, available from the early 
1970s to 1995, has been updated to 2007 or 2008, providing around 30-35 annual time-series 
observations each for most of the 17 countries.13 We exclude data after 2008 to avoid long-run 
estimates being unduly affected by the large shock (associated with the global financial crisis and 
its aftermath) to fiscal, GDP and other variables from their equilibrium values at the end of our 
period. 
Data on GDP and the two control variables – the private investment/GDP ratio and 
employment growth – were obtained for the same period from OECD sources. An important 
difference from previous studies of taxes/public spending and GDP is that our investment control 
variable is private non-residential investment (PNRI) instead of total investment (gross fixed 
capital formation). Since all regressions include various public expenditure variables, the use of 
                                                        
10 Indeed, where the variables are I(1), they argue that the estimates are super-consistent. 
11 See, for example, Pesaran (1997, pp. 182-185), Pesaran and Shin (1999, pp. 381-387; 404-405). 
12 The 17 OECD countries are: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Iceland, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, UK and US. Other OECD countries are 
excluded due to missing values for several years of the time series from the early 1970s to 2008; see Appendix A. 
13 This is not straightforward, however, because of changes in the GFS methodology, which moved from a cash 
accounting basis to an accruals accounting basis for fiscal data from the late 1990s onwards. ; see Appendix A. 
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PNRI avoids the possibility of ‘double counting’ much public investment which otherwise would 
contribute to both the investment and public expenditure data. 
In addition, before running all regressions we de-mean all data series as recommended by 
Lee et al. (1997) and Pesaran et al. (1999) to deal with potential cross-sectional error correlation. 
That is, all variables are measured as deviations from their sample means in each year, acting 
analogously to time dummies, thus removing common shocks in the data. 
IV. Empirical results 
Pre-testing for lag lengths 
As discussed in section III, following Pesaran and Shin (1999), regressions on equation (3) 
require knowledge of the appropriate lag structure if long-run parameter estimates are to be 
interpretable as capturing exogenous or weakly exogenous effects; see below. Before running 
our PMG regressions, our procedure therefore follows the pre-test proposed by Pesaran and Shin 
(1999) to select the preferred lag structure for the dependent, and each independent, variable 
based on the Schwarz Information Criterion (see Pesaran and Shin, 1999). This uses up to two 
lags for each variable and country; in practice we find that two lags are required relatively 
rarely.14 The results of PMG regressions on equation (3) reported below are based on the model-
selected lag structures. 
Testing for total public expenditure effects 
Before examining the GDP effects of the share of particular expenditure categories it is worth 
noting the impact of the implicit financing category in the government budget constraint 
methodology because it changes the interpretation of the included parameters. As the parameter 
estimates on the shares of individual spending categories in total expenditure are unaffected by 
this we omit them from the regressions for the moment. 
Table 1 shows the long-run and short-run parameters for six PMG regressions in which total 
spending is included, financed by combinations of three alternative fiscal variables (non-
distortionary taxes, deficits and distortionary taxes) in columns 1-4. Column 5 repeats the 
regression in column 2, but with the private investment control variable omitted.15 Results for 
alternative (MG and DFE) estimators are then reported in Table 2. 
                                                        
14For example, in each of regressions 1 – 3 of Table 1, there are a maximum of 204 possible parameters (17 countries 
x 6 included variables x 2 lags). Regression 4 involves 5 variables, hence 170 possible parameters. For those four 
regressions, two lags were selected in only 11%, 8%, 9% and 4% respectively of the possible cases. 
15 In general the ‘non-distortionary’ taxes in this context are consumption taxes. The term ‘less growth distortionary’ 
may be more appropriate in this case since these taxes can distort investment decisions in models where labour 
supply effects are allowed for. The method of aggregating the GFS functional classification into these sub-aggregates 
is described in Bleaney et al. (2001). ‘Other revenues’ refers to the GFS categories ‘taxes on international trade and 
transactions’, ‘other taxes’ and ‘non tax revenues’. It is unclear how distortionary these might be. This category of 
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[Table 1 about here] 
In interpreting the parameters in Table 1, it should be borne in mind that the data have been 
de-meaned; hence the parameters estimate the impact of a deviation from OECD mean levels of 
the variable in question on deviations of GDP per capita from the OECD mean, in a given year. 
The role of different implicit financing of fiscal variables excluded from regressions has been 
discussed by Gemmell et al. (2011) so is only briefly reviewed here. 
Regression 1 in Table 1 reveals that increasing total public spending, financed by the 
(omitted) non-distortionary taxes has a long-run output effect that is positive and statistically 
significantly different from zero. However, the same spending increase can alternatively be 
financed by either a reduced budget surplus (regression 2), or by an increase in distortionary 
taxes and/or increases in any/all taxes (regressions 3 and 4), or by some combination. Regressions 
2-4 in Table 1 show that each of those cases produces a negative, statistically significant long-
run parameter on the public expenditure variable. That is, the assumed (or imposed) method of 
financing a public expenditure increase is crucial for identifying the likely impact of that 
expenditure on long-run levels of GDP per capita. 
The evidence in Table 1 suggests that, within our dataset, use of ‘non-distortionary’ forms 
of taxation (such as VAT) to fund a given unit of additional public spending has been associated, 
ceteris paribus, with increases in GDP per capita levels in the long-run, whereas other forms of 
financing such spending have been associated with decreases in GDP per capita in the long-run.16 
Table 1 results for the total public expenditure parameters also tend to suggest that the adverse 
long run effects on GDP per capita from distortionary tax financing (at –0.024) are significantly 
greater than those associated with other forms of financing (around –0.012). However this should 
be interpreted cautiously. As we show below, specifications that also allow for different effects 
on GDP per capita from differences in specific public expenditure shares (see Table 3) suggests 
that the magnitude of the total expenditure parameter can be somewhat sensitive to the included 
expenditure share variables. 
Recognising that some fiscal-GDP effects could be mediated through private investment (as 
opposed to via factor productivity), regression 5 in Table 1 examines whether omitting 
investment from the control variables affects conclusions regarding the GDP impacts of public 
                                                        
other revenues amounts to 13.4% of total revenues in our sample, and non-tax revenues account for 9.6% of total 
revenues. 
16 The control variables in these regressions generally perform as expected: larger investment ratios and 
employment growth (proxying labour force growth) are associated with higher GDP per capita, though the former 
is not statistically robust, sometimes taking a negative sign.  The ‘lagged residual’ term captures the error correction 
parameter, i, in (3) and, at around –0.03 to –0.09, it implies a fairly high degree of persistence. 
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expenditure. Comparing regressions 2 and 5 (the equivalent, budget deficit-financed cases), the 
estimates suggest that parameters on fiscal variables, including total public expenditure, are little 
affected by the omission; that is, public expenditure effects are largely orthogonal to private 
investment effects.17 
Overall, while the results in Table 1 yield similar estimates of fiscal variable impacts on 
GDP (when the appropriate interpretation is recognised as discussed above), our preferred 
specification is regression 2 which omits the budget surplus. This facilitates interpretation 
because deficit-funded tax or expenditure changes have an intuitive economic interpretation and 
because across all countries a one unit change in a budget surplus/deficit is a more uniform metric 
whereas this is less true for a one unit change in distortionary or non-distortionary tax. This is 
because the composition of these tax variables can differ across countries, for example, the shares 
of personal and corporate income taxes, or VAT and excise taxes, typically differ across 
countries, and each may differ in their GDP impacts. We therefore base our further testing of 
public expenditure effects using this specification that omits the budget surplus. 
As noted above, the PMG estimator provides a greater degree of flexibility, compared to 
dynamic fixed effects models, in estimating long-run effects by allowing short-run parameters to 
differ across countries. The Mean Group estimator allows for further flexibility via 
heterogeneous long-run effects across countries but at a further cost in terms of degrees of 
freedom. We therefore test for possible sensitivity of our Table 1 results to the PMG 
specification. Based on regression 2 in Table 1, Table 2 presents equivalent results for dynamic 
fixed effects and mean group models (and repeats PMG results for comparison; non-fiscal 
variables are included in regressions but omitted from the table to save space). 
Of immediate note in Table 2, the parameters on each fiscal variable take the same signs and 
are of similar orders of magnitude. However standard errors are generally larger using the MG 
or DFE estimators such that parameter estimates for those cases are generally not statistically 
significant at conventional levels. That this is the case for the MG estimates is no surprise, given 
the averaging involved across heterogeneous long-run parameter estimates. However the 
comparison between PMG and DFE suggests that allowing for heterogeneous short-run 
parameters across countries (in the PMG) enables more precise long-run parameter estimates to 
be obtained. This mirrors results obtained by Gemmell et al. (2011, pp.F43-44) who also find 
                                                        
17 This is perhaps not surprising, given the limited contribution to long-run output apparently due to private 
investment in Table 1. To investigate this issue further we ran similar regressions with original, rather than de-
meaned, data. This yielded a larger, statistically significant investment parameter. This may reflect a high degree of 
co-movement in private investment across countries such that, after de-meaning the data, there is little country-
specific variation in the investment data, or that any such variation is largely unrelated to countries’ long-run per 
capita GDP levels (though it may still have a strong effect on short-run growth rates). 
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that the DFE, unlike the PMG, requires a lag structure of up to eight lags to identify long-run 
parameters.18 
The far right-hand column of Table 2 also reports results from Hausman tests of the PMG 
restrictions against those associated with the (less restricted) MG estimators for each fiscal 
variable and the regression specification as a whole. The final row compares the PMG regression 
with the DFE equivalent. The Hausman tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of non-systematic 
differences in parameters, supporting the PMG restriction of homogeneous long-run effects 
across countries. This also holds for the regression as a whole (2(5) = 7.20; p-value = 0.21). By 
contrast, the Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis that differences between the PMG and DFE 
are not systematic (2(5) = 16.51; p-value = 0.00); that is, the additional short-run restrictions of 
the DFE model are rejected. 
Finally, though results in Table 2 appear to support long-run parameter homogeneity, in 
Appendix Table B1 we report MG parameter estimates for total public expenditure by country, 
as well as cross-country means and medians. From Table 2, the mean long-run MG parameter 
for total public spending is 0.020 (t = 1.65). The appendix table shows that, when long-run 
parameters are allowed to differ, three countries, Sweden, Australia and New Zealand, take 
relatively large (absolute) parameter values for total expenditure (0.20, 0.07, 0.06 
respectively). However, for 13 of the 17 countries parameter estimates are negative and generally 
close to the arithmetic mean (median) long-run estimates of 0.020 (0.009). 
Public Expenditure Composition and GDP 
To explore the potential long-run effects of public spending composition on GDP, we again focus 
on the Table 1 specification (PMG; regression 2) in which changes in total spending are implicitly 
funded from an increased budget deficit (reduced budget surplus). Table 3 shows the results from 
repeating this PMG regression, but adding the shares of each GFS public spending category  
transport & communications (T&C), education, health, etc.  in total expenditure (excluding 
interest payments). To save space the table shows only the parameters on total public expenditure 
and the spending decompositions of interest. 
Due to a lack of degrees of freedom, it is not possible to include all (n-1) detailed categories 
in one regression though, as noted earlier, it would be possible to construct the growth trade-off 
associated with any bilateral expenditure share switch. The parameter on each expenditure share 
in regressions (1)–(9) should therefore be interpreted as the impact on long-run per capita GDP 
                                                        
18 Recall that the MG parameters reported are unweighted averages of the country-specific values. As a result this 
average can be heavily influenced by a few extreme values, even when these are imprecisely estimated. 
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levels of switching spending into the included expenditure category (say, T&C) and away from 
remaining expenditure categories on a pro rata basis, holding total spending constant as a ratio 
of GDP. A significant positive (negative) parameter therefore indicates that the category in 
question has a greater (smaller) impact on long-run GDP than the remaining expenditure 
categories. 
Note first that all regressions (except the regression for T&C) reveal net negative total 
spending growth effects when funded from increased budget deficits (consistent with Table 1 
results for this form of financing). Whilst the positive short-term GDP impacts of fiscal stimulus 
packages have been important in the recent macroeconomic debates (discussed further below), 
these initial results are consistent with a possible adverse impact on GDP per capita over the 
longer run if higher deficit-financed expenditure levels persist. 
Switching into some spending categories might be expected to have limited effects on GDP 
either where there are negligible short-run impacts from the relevant public expenditures or 
where the ‘favoured’ category has similar (possibly substantial) GDP impacts to those categories 
where spending shares decrease. For example, as in Barro (1990), if public spending levels and 
shares have each been set in a growth-maximising manner there should be no evidence of output 
benefits or costs from reallocating expenditures. However, clearly some public spending in 
OECD countries is allocated to meet non-growth objectives such as social welfare provision or 
redistribution, and lack of knowledge of the growth effects of different spending types may also 
inhibit growth-maximising policy choices. 
[Table 3 about here] 
We find, in Table 3, that most of the expenditure shares exhibit small positive or negative 
long-run GDP effects that are not statistically different from zero. However, we also find that 
some changes in the mix of public expenditures have significant effects on GDP over the long-
run. In interpreting regression parameter estimates it is important to remember that these 
represent the combined impact of one additional unit of a particular type of spending (say, 
education), financed by reductions in other spending categories 
Table 3 provides evidence of potential positive GDP effects from changes in T&C, education 
and (less reliably identified) housing spending shares. The parameter for health spending is 
positive but small and with a relatively large standard error. Negative long-run associations with 
GDP are observed for spending shares for social welfare, defence, economic services, general 
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public services and recreational services, but only for general public services is the estimate 
statistically significant at 10% or less.19 
The parameters in Table 3 can be interpreted as follows. Consider the spending share with 
the largest estimated GDP impact in Table 3: T&C at 0.022. Across the sample, the T&C 
spending share averages 5.5% (standard error = 3.3%), and GDP per capita growth averages 
2.0% (standard error = 2.4%). Hence a permanent 1 percentage point increase in the T&C share 
in total spending (e.g. from 5.5% to 6.5%) is associated, on average, with a long-run level of 
GDP per capita that is 2.2% higher than the counterfactual of an unchanged T&C spending 
share.20 Thus, considering a 20 year horizon, GDP compounded at 2.0% growth per year would 
be expected to rise from 100 to 148.6 after 20 years in the absence of any T&C change. The 1 
percentage point T&C share increase to 6.5% is thus predicted to raise GDP to around 150.8 
instead of 148.6 after 20 years. 
Equivalently this implies that the GDP expected after 20 years with no T&C change is 
reached approximately one year earlier when the T&C spending share increase permanently to 
6.5% from 5.5%. This increase in GDP seems a plausible order of magnitude arising from a 
persistent non-marginal reallocation (about one-third of the sample standard error) towards a 
directly growth-enhancing spending category, and away from all other spending categories pro 
rata which, according to our estimates, have much less positive or zero/negative impacts on GDP. 
These results align with a number of findings within the current literature. For example, 
Nijkamp and Poot (2004), in their meta-analysis of studies of fiscal policy and growth, report the 
positive impact of infrastructure and education, especially public education investment spending, 
on GDP as finding broad support in the literature. They conclude (p.91): ‘On balance, the 
evidence for a positive effect of conventional fiscal policy on growth is rather weak, but the 
commonly identified importance of education and infrastructure is confirmed’. Our results are 
also consistent to those found more recently by Alfonso and Jalles (2014) and Acosta-Ormaechea 
and Morozumi (2013), who show evidence of a positive impact of education and health and 
negative effect for social security and welfare. 
Vandenbussche et al. (2006) and Aghion et al. (2009) provide evidence that the impact of 
education attainment and public education spending on growth rates depend on the proximity of 
                                                        
19As with Table 1 results, we have also examined whether the PMG results in Table 3 are preferred to either a MG 
or DFE approach. Results are reported in Appendix Table B2, which again confirms that the PMG estimates are 
preferred, on a Hausman test, to either the MG or the DFE estimates. Both these other approaches tend to yield noisy 
parameter estimates for public expenditure variables. 
20Recall that our results relate to a change relative to the average of the OECD sample; hence we assume here that 
only one country experiences the simulated T&C spending share increase. 
 18 
a country to the technological frontier and the composition of the educational investment. 
Education in general, and higher-level education in particular (e.g. research-related and tertiary), 
have larger positive effects closer to the frontier. 
Are expenditure-GDP effects endogenous? 
Perhaps the most frequently cited reason for skepticism regarding the validity, or interpretation, 
of aggregate growth regressions is the possibility that estimated relationships represent 
correlations but not causation.21 For our results so far, we cannot discount the possibility that the 
evidence arises from simultaneous relationships between GDP and fiscal variables. That is, as 
well as direct impacts of fiscal variables on GDP, changes in GDP may be inducing changes in 
these fiscal variables. It is also possible that fiscal policy changes will be associated with country-
specific time-varying variables, such as political conditions, that also influence GDP levels or 
growth rates. 
The arguments that higher GDP levels or growth rates induce changes in total government 
expenditure or taxation are well known. Economic downturns reduce taxable capacity and lead 
to increases in certain types of public expenditure such as unemployment benefits and social 
insurance payments. Though these may be at the expense of other types of expenditure, this is 
often insufficient to prevent total spending from rising in downturns. Short-run contractions of 
less cyclically-dependent expenditures, such as public investment, are typically more difficult to 
achieve when social expenditures increase; see Sanz and Velázquez (2004) and Sanz (2010). 
The effect on expenditure components is more ambiguous. As already noted, social welfare 
expenditures might be expected to rise in response to an economic downturn implying a negative 
correlation with GDP. On the other hand, the share of more ‘productive’ expenditures would be 
expected to rise when faster GDP growth generates additional revenues, and demands for 
welfare-related expenditures, such as social insurance, weaken. This would have contrasting 
effects on the shares of these different components of expenditure in total expenditure and for 
total expenditure as a ratio to GDP. In addition, it is sometimes argued that over the longer-term 
some public expenditures such as education and health, display income-elastic qualities so that 
higher income levels induce greater consumer demand for such services typically delivered via 
public spending (Slemrod, 1995). 
These arguments suggest the possibility that our previous evidence of positive impacts on 
GDP of T&C, education etc, and some negative impacts associated with, for example, social 
welfare spending or ‘economic services’, might reflect these reverse causation arguments. Or 
                                                        
21 See Slemrod (1995) for a robust critique of this issue both in principle and with respect to cross-country empirical 
evidence. 
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they may simply be the outcome of fiscal variables being correlated with time-varying 
unobservable factors that affect GDP. Similarly, endogenous responses could also account for 
our estimated relationship between GDP and (deficit-financed) total public expenditure, if 
economic downturns induce additional total spending in association with worsening deficits. 
Pesaran and Shin (1999) contend that, in the context of ARDL models, the problem of 
endogenous regressors can readily be handled by the PMG where the regressors are I(1) and not 
cointegrated among themselves. In this case, Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) 
show that endogeneity can be corrected by an appropriate augmentation of the lag structure of 
the ARDL(p, q) model  to an ARDL(p, m) model, where m ≥ q. Endogeneity of I(1) regressors 
can be accommodated by a projection of the errors on the regressors. An ARDL with sufficiently 
long lags overcomes the endogeneity problem if regressors are not cointegrated, and where the 
focus of the analysis is on the long run coefficients (see Pesaran and Shin, 1999, pp. 372-3; 384-
5). 
To explore these endogeneity issues for our case we first check whether our variables are 
I(0) or I(1) and whether they are cointegrated. Secondly, we consider the appropriate lag structure 
for our ARDL(p, m) model. We discuss each in turn below. 
Testing the order of integration and cointegration 
We begin by testing whether our variable as are I(0) or I(1), using the panel unit root tests of 
Harris-Tzavalis (1999), Breitung (2000) and Pesaran (2007). Results are reported in Appendix 
Table B3. The Harris-Tzavalis (1999) test assumes that all panels have the same autoregressive 
parameter and that the number of time periods is fixed. The Breitung (2000) test also assumes 
that all panels have a common autoregressive parameter, but Breitung shows that the test has 
power in the heterogeneous case, where each can take its own autoregressive parameter.22 The 
Harris-Tzavalis test rejects the null hypothesis of non-stationarity only for the budget surplus and 
employment growth. The Breitung test rejects the null for these two variables along with the 
housing and economic services spending shares. Note, however, that in the regression 
specifications that are the main focus of our analysis, the budget surplus is omitted. 
The second generation panel unit root test of Pesaran (2007) – the cross-sectionally 
augmented Im, Pesaran and Shin (CIPS) test – allows for heterogeneity in the autoregressive 
coefficient of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller regression with lagged cross-sectional mean and its 
first difference capturing the cross-sectional dependence. Pesaran (2007) shows that the CIPS 
                                                        
22Breitung’s (2000) Monte Carlo simulations suggest that his test is substantially more powerful than other panel 
unit-root tests for the modest-size dataset he considered (N=20, T=30), which is similar to the sample size we have 
here. 
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test has satisfactory size and power even for relatively small samples. According to this test, all 
of our variables are I(1) except employment growth and the defence spending share. Overall, 
from these three tests it seems that our variables are best treated as non-stationary except for the 
budget surplus and employment growth. After taking first differences, however, the panel test 
(not reported) rejects the null of non-stationarity for each of the variables. From this we conclude 
that all the variables are I(1), except employment growth and budget surplus. 
For the cointegration test, we implement the error-correction, based panel cointegration tests 
developed by Westerlund (2007), based on structural rather than residual dynamics, which 
therefore does not impose any common-factor restrictions. The idea is to test the null hypothesis 
of no cointegration by inferring whether the error-correction term in a conditional panel error-
correction model is equal to zero. The tests (Pa and Pt)
 23 are general enough to allow for a large 
degree of heterogeneity, both in the long-run cointegrating relationship and in the short-run 
dynamics, and dependence within as well as across the cross-sectional units. Pa and Pt test the 
alternative hypothesis that the panel is cointegrated as a whole. 
First we test whether the variables included in the PMG regression 1.2 (the base estimation 
for subsequent regressions in Table 3) are cointegrated, including GDP per capita, our fiscal 
variables and investment. Appendix Table B3 shows that Pt rejects the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration for all of our PMG specifications at a 5% level whereas Pa marginally fails to reject 
the hypothesis at a 10% level (p-value 0.13). In contrast, these two tests do not reject the 
hypothesis of no cointegration among our regressors. Including expenditure shares in the 
cointegration test does not change this conclusion. Our model therefore appears to fulfill the first 
set of Pesaran and Shin (1999) conditions which allows the ARDL model to overcome 
endogeneity: namely, I(1) variables and non-cointegrated regressors. 
Now we turn to the second condition to correct for the problem of endogenous regressors, 
namely, the appropriate modification of the orders of the ARDL. 
Testing the ARDL lag structure 
Pesaran et al. (1999) and Pesaran and Shin (1999) stress the importance of allowing a 
sufficiently long lag structure to deal with endogeneity problems in this ARDL context. Their 
proposed method of correcting for endogeneity – in the form of contemporaneous correlation 
among the error terms of (2.1) and (2.2) – is by ‘appropriate augmentation’ of the lag structure 
                                                        
23 The two differ because they start from a weighted average of the individually estimated coefficients (Pa), or their 
respective t-ratios (Pt). 
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of the ARDL(p, q) model. Their method assumes zero cross-correlation among lagged errors; 
namely Cov(i,t-i ui,t-i) = 0, for i ≠ j. 
In particular, they show that running an ARDL(p, m) model where m = max(q, s+1), where 
s is the appropriately selected lag length of the autoregression of Xi,t in (2.2), yields consistent 
estimates of the long-run parameters of interest. Hence ‘in the context of the ARDL model 
inference on the long run parameters is quite simple and requires a priori knowledge or 
estimation of the orders of the extended ARDL(p, m) model. Appropriate modification of the 
orders of the ARDL model is sufficient to simultaneously correct for the residual serial 
correlation and the problem of endogenous regressors.’ (Pesaran and Shin, 1999, p.386). 
These arguments for ‘augmentation’ may be thought of as applying to an initial ARDL(p, q) 
model where lags have been chosen a priori as described by Pesaran and Shin above. Thus, for 
example, where an initially selected ARDL (1, 1) suffers from endogeneity, this may be corrected 
by running an ARDL(p, m) model where m  1, based on estimates of the lag structure from 
regressions of (2.2).24 
The PMG regressions discussed earlier in this section, were obtained using the Pesaran and 
Shin (1999) two-step strategy in which we first chose p, the number of lags for (log) GDP per 
capita, and m the number of lags for our independent variables (fiscal policy, investment and 
employment growth). Following Pesaran and Shin (1999), these were chosen using the Schwarz 
Criterion (SC) to identify the appropriate lag structure.25 Hence, arguably our previous estimates 
should be regarded as obtained from an ARDL(p, m) model, with suitably long lag structures.  
However, to allow for the possibility that a longer lag structure is required to deal with 
possible endogeneity problems, we also ran equivalent regressions to those reported in Table 3 
but based on an ARDL(2, 2) model rather than the ARDL(p ≤ 2, m ≤ 2) reported there.26 Results 
from the two models, for the expenditure variables of interest, are compared in Table 4. The key 
differences between the two specifications, in terms of the expenditure share parameter estimates, 
are as follows. 
Firstly, the two expenditures previously found to have significant effects on GDP T&C and 
education have smaller parameter estimates in Table 4 but still statistically significant (at the 
5% level). Secondly other expenditure share parameters  for the major spending categories of 
                                                        
24 Computation of valid standard errors for the long-run parameters in our PMG models has been carried out by the 
so-called delta method. 
25Pesaran and Shin (1999) claim, from Monte Carlo experiments on the ARDL(p, m) model, that the Schwarz Criterion 
is slightly superior to the Akaike information Criterion (AIC). 
26 Testing more than two lags is inhibited by the loss of degrees of freedom in our case. 
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health, housing, social welfare and defence are generally larger (in absolute value) in Table 4 
and are now statistically different from zero; negative in the case of social welfare and defence.27 
[Table 4 about here] 
Our interpretation of these results is that, allowing the ARDL model to select the appropriate 
lag length is preferable, while allowing for a longer fixed lag length of two periods accommodates 
the possibility that additional lagged effects may be erroneously omitted when selecting lags via 
the Schwarz Criterion. Results suggest that this latter approach, tends to strengthen, rather than 
weaken, the case for significant causal impacts from a number of public expenditure categories 
on long-run GDP levels. 
Weak exogeneity tests 
As noted earlier, Pesaran and Shin (1999) contend that the PMG overcomes endogeneity, 
assuming zero cross-correlation among lagged errors; namely Cov(i,t-i ui,t-i) = 0 for i ≠ j. We can 
therefore check formally whether our fiscal variables are ‘weakly exogenous’ or ‘long-run 
forcing’ for GDP. That is, whether changes in the fiscal variables can be shown to be statistically 
unrelated to the error correction term from the Table 3 regressions. Each fiscal variable may still 
react to its own lagged changes, lagged changes of other fiscal and non-fiscal variables, and to 
lagged changes in GDP growth. 
As shown by Johansen (1992) and Boswijk (1995), weak exogeneity of the long-run 
parameters can be checked by estimating marginal models for each of our fiscal variables and 
using a variable addition test to assess the statistical significance of the error correction terms 
obtained from Table 3 regressions for each of those marginal models. If we can show that the 
fiscal variables are potentially long-run forcing for GDP, we could then interpret our results in 
Tables 1 and 3 as causal effects. 
Specifically, following Calderón et al. (2014), we test for weak exogeneity of our vector of 
fiscal and investment variables, Xi,t, in the following marginal models: 
∆𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽𝑖,1∆𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝑖,2∆𝑿𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛼𝑖,1∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛼𝑖,2∆𝑌𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝑖𝜉𝑖,𝑡(?̂?) + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 (4) 
where 𝑥𝑖,𝑡 represents each element of the vector of fiscal/investment variables Xi,t; 𝜉𝑖,𝑡(?̂?) =
(𝑌𝑖,𝑡−1 − ?̂?𝑿𝑖,𝑡−1) are the estimated long-run equilibrium error correction (ECM) terms from the 
Table 3 regressions; and i,t is a random error term.28 Hence the X vector includes total 
expenditure, distortionary taxes, non-distortionary taxes, non-residential private investment (all 
                                                        
27The smaller spending categories (general public, and recreation, services) appear non-robust, involving a change 
of sign. 
28 Results reported below from regressions on (4) also include a constant term. 
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as percentages of GDP), and the shares of each expenditure component in total public 
expenditure. The null hypothesis of weak exogeneity involves testing that the i = 0. This may 
take the form of a t-test on individual i for each variable, or a Wald test that the is are jointly 
zero for all the suspected endogenous variables. Rejection of the null in each case implies 
rejection of weak exogeneity. 
For each of the nine estimations in Table 3, we perform five different marginal models (for 
the four fiscal variables and investment  the potentially endogenous variables) country by 
country. We use the MG approach to average the coefficients on the ECM term across countries 
and then test its significance across the panel countries as a whole using the MG standard error 
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995). In addition, we perform the equivalent weak exogeneity test for each 
country separately. 
Row 1 of Table 5 shows results for weak exogeneity tests on the fiscal variables and 
investment entering Table 1 regression (2) – the equivalent regression to those reported in Table 
3 but excluding any expenditure share variables. Each cell contains the estimate (t-ratio) for the 
unweighted average MG error correction parameters in (4) for each country. Beneath these 
values, the cell indicates the number of individual countries for which the null hypothesis of weak 
endogeneity is rejected. It can be seen that, for three of the four fiscal/investment variables we 
cannot reject weak exogeneity across the sample of countries. While the null hypothesis is 
rejected across all countries combined for one variable, ‘distortionary and other taxes’, it is clear 
that for all four variables in row 1, the null hypothesis is accepted in all, or nearly all, (17) 
countries. Hence one or two countries appear to drive the overall result for distortionary taxes. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Rows 2-10 show results for the weak exogeneity tests for each expenditure share (based on 
Table 3). Of particular interest here is the t-ratio on each expenditure share variable (column 1). 
This reveals that, only in the case of the T&C and economic services share is the mean MG 
parameter in the marginal model statistically significantly different from zero (at 5%). More 
importantly perhaps, across the 9 expenditure shares there is typically only 1 or 2 of the 17 
countries for which the individual country value of i is statistically non-zero. These results offer 
fairly strong support to the view that the expenditure share variables can be considered weakly 
exogenous and hence ‘long-run forcing’ for GDP. 
A similar conclusion emerges from Table 5 for the other variables in the regression. That is, 
the average MG parameter (across all countries) is not significantly different from zero in most 
cases, and this is also true for the vast majority of individual country estimates. Out of a total of 
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36 parameter sets (9 spending shares x 4 variables) for 17 countries, weak exogeneity is never 
rejected in more than 4 out of 17 countries, is rejected for 3 or 4 out of 17 countries only 8 times 
(out of a possible 36), with the remainder rejected in only 02 out of the 17 countries. 
Finally, the parameter ?̂? in (4) which we have subjected to the weak exogeneity test is 
obtained from the previous model in which lag lengths were selected endogenously using the 
Schwarz Criterion, as described above. Given some uncertainly regarding the number of lags 
required to remove potential endogeneity, we re-ran Table 1 and Table 3 regressions on equation 
(3) imposing an ARDL (2, 2) structure. Weak exogeneity tests on the ?̂? parameter estimates 
obtained from these regressions are reported in Appendix Table B4. If anything, these reveal 
even stronger support for weak exogeneity that those in Table 4.  
Based on the weak exogeneity results in the previous sub-section, whether it is necessary to 
impose two lags on the ARDL model to deal with endogeneity is unclear. However, to the extent 
that the longer lag structure is warranted, this would seem to strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
case for statistically significant effects on GDP (in plausible directions) from a number of public 
expenditure categories. We are inclined to be circumspect, based on Table 3, in claiming that 
exogenous positive impacts on GDP are associated at least with greater transport & 
communications and education spending. However, there is also some support for positive 
(negative) effects from reallocating spending towards health and housing (social welfare and 
defence). 
Short-run dynamics 
As the short-run dynamics in the PMG regressions are allowed to differ across countries, 
it is possible that the short run output effects of a given fiscal change differ across countries 
both in initial direction and in the speed with which the long run effect is realised. The trajectory 
followed by each country is determined by the estimated lag structure on each fiscal variable 
for that country together with its error-correction parameter, i, in equation (3). 
Given the noise associated with estimates of the short-run dynamics for each country, little 
reliance can be placed on these estimates and we do not discuss them here.29 Instead, Figure 1 
shows the ‘average’ time path of GDP per capita growth rates associated with a 1 percentage 
point change in year 0 in each of the larger expenditure categories: T&C, education, health, 
and social security, based on Tables 3 regressions. We use the average of the country short-run 
                                                        
29In addition, Pesaran and Shin (1999, pp.372, 384-5) warn that, even though the long-run parameters obtained from 
the PMG are consistent and converge to their asymptotic values relatively quickly, short-run parameters converge 
more slowly. These authors also conclude that an appropriate choice of the order of the ARDL model overcomes 
endogeneity of the long-run parameters, but short-run effects would still require explicit modelling of the 
contemporaneous dependence among the error terms of (2.1) and (2.2). 
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PMG parameters; hence obtained under the assumption of homogeneous long-run parameters. 
Note however that the estimated long-run parameters for health and social welfare were not 
statistically different from zero. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
As expected the figure suggests that GDP per capita growth converges on zero, as GDP 
per capita converges on its new long-run value following the 1% ‘shock’. However for the two 
significantly positive spending types (T&C, education) there is considerable persistence with 
growth effects still evident after 20 years. In addition, the immediate impact (years 1 and 2) is 
noticeably more positive for T&C than for education – a result that seems plausible given the 
known immediate output effects of infrastructure-related investment compared to education 
spending which can be expected to take longer to impact on output. For social security, Figure 
1 suggests the possibility of negative short-run growth effects – also a plausible result as 
spending is reallocated from other categories likely to be less dominated by consumption 
spending. 
V. Conclusions 
This paper has offered some new evidence for OECD countries on the impact of the size and 
composition of public expenditure on GDP per capita. Many previous regression analyses have 
been unclear about which specific elements of the government budget are omitted from their 
analyses, or interpretation of parameter estimates is made difficult where several elements are 
explicitly or implicitly omitted. Clearly however, the method of financing any spending increase 
matters, whether this involves higher taxes (with differing distortionary characteristics), higher 
deficits, or reductions in alternative spending categories. Previous studies have also generally 
tested endogenous growth model specifications with permanent growth effects, and endogeneity 
concerns remain regarding the reliability of these previous estimates. 
Our examination of the impact of public expenditure on GDP for OECD countries has sought 
to deal explicitly with the financing aspects, allowed output effects to be persistent rather than 
permanent, and specifically addressed potential endogeneity concerns. Using longer time-series 
data than has been examined hitherto allowed us to apply more flexible (pooled mean group) 
methods that can accommodate heterogeneous, short-run responses across countries. We 
examined the growth impacts of changes in total government expenditure, alongside changes in 
the shares of spending devoted to various categories. 
Both our initial PMG results and those that explicitly account for contemporaneous 
correlation, find robust long-run positive effects on GDP per capita levels for transport & 
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communication and education, with some evidence supporting positive (negative) effects for 
housing and health (social welfare) spending. Our results do not support positive long-run output 
effects from switching expenditure towards defense spending, despite the growth benefits 
sometimes claimed for this category of spending. In our analysis, the estimated effects of a switch 
into defense spending involve pro-rata reductions in other spending categories including T&C 
and education. 
Though our growth model specification precludes permanent effects on the growth rate of 
GDP per capita, we nevertheless estimate relatively persistent effects on growth rates from 
simulated T&C and education expenditure changes that last for 20 years or more. 
Our results also confirm that the assumed form of expenditure financing is crucial for 
estimated growth effects, whether for aggregate spending or for individual categories. In general 
we find evidence of negative long-run effects on output from deficit-financed increases in total 
public spending. Our interpretation is that such increases in public expenditure cannot be 
expected to be growth-enhancing unless the specific forms of that expenditure are considered 
carefully. Pro-rata expansions in particular would appear to be growth-retarding on average 
across OECD countries. 
The effects of spending share changes are obtained here under the assumption that total 
spending remains unchanged and spending reallocations occur on this pro-rata basis. The 
evidence of positive long-run effects on GDP per capita from increases in transport & 
communication, and education spending shares appear to be robust and are consistent with the 
message from an increasing body of recent research. This points to the possibility that current 
levels of such spending in OECD countries are sub-optimal from a growth perspective, though 
clearly this may be consistent with a wider social welfare objective. 
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TABLE 1 
Testing expenditure levels & implicit financing: pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth rate 
Regression No.: 1 2 3 4 5 
Fiscal variables financed 
by: 
Non-distort. 
taxes 
Budget 
Surplus 
Distortionary 
taxes 
Distortionary& non-
distort. taxes 
Budget 
Surplus 
Long run effects      
Budget surplus 
0.022** 
(2.34) 
- -0.020** 
(4.64) 
-0.013** 
(3.08) 
- 
Distortionary taxes 
-0.060** 
(-4.56) 
-0.012** 
(2.84) 
- - -0.014** 
(3.11) 
Non-distortionary taxes 
- 0.023** 
(4.71) 
0.051** 
(7.78) 
- 0.029** 
(5.27) 
Total Public Expenditure 
0.020** 
(2.17) 
-0.013** 
(5.29) 
-0.024** 
(6.12) 
-0.012** 
(3.44) 
-0.012** 
(4.94) 
Investment ratio 
0.029** 
(2.79) 
-0.007** 
(2.41) 
0.021** 
(3.32) 
-0.004 
(1.08) 
- 
Employment growth 
0.063** 
(4.72) 
0.020** 
(4.93) 
0.041** 
(7.03) 
0.039 
(6.37) 
0.026** 
(5.12) 
Lagged residual 
-0.039** 
(4.80) 
-0.092** 
(6.16) 
-0.062** 
(5.12) 
-0.077* 
(6.32) 
-0.092** 
(5.49) 
Short run effects (average)      
Short run. Total Public 
Expenditure. 1st Difference 
-0.002 
(1.83) 
-0.001 
(1.44) 
-0.001* 
(2.07) 
-0.001 
(1.57) 
-0.001** 
(2.93) 
Short run. Total Public 
Expenditure. 2nd  Difference 
-0.000 
(1.00) 
0.000 
(1.19) 
0.000 
(1.14) 
0.000 
(0.00) 
0.000 
(1.18) 
Note:t-statistics in parentheses below parameters; *, ** = significant at the 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
TABLE 2 
Testing expenditure levels:comparing regression methods 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth rate 
Regression No. 2.1 2.2 2.3  
Financed by: Budget Surplus 
Pooled Mean 
Group 
Dynamic Fixed 
Effects: 
Mean Group: Hausman Tests 
Distort. tax & other revenues 
-0.012** 
(2.84) 
-0.015 
(1.71) 
-0.018 
(0.74) 
χ2(1) 0.08 
p-value 0.78 
Non-distortionary taxes 
0.023** 
(4.71) 
0.024 
(1.72) 
0.094 
(1.50) 
χ2(1) 1.30 
p-value 0.25 
Total public expenditure 
-0.013** 
(5.29) 
-0.007 
(1.28) 
-0.020 
(1.65) 
χ2(1) 0.36 
p-value 0.55 
MG versus PMG  
   χ2(5): 7.20 
p-value 0.21 
PMG versus DFE 
   χ2(5):16.51 
p-value 0.00 
Note:t-statistics in parentheses below parameters; *, ** = significant at the 5%, 1% respectively. All regressions 
include the three non-fiscal control variables shown in Table 1. All coefficients are estimated long-run effects 
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TABLE 3 
Testing public expenditure composition: pooled mean group estimates 
Dependent variable: Annual GDP per capita growth rate 
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Share of: T&C Educat- 
ion 
Health Hous- 
ing 
Social 
welfare 
Defence Econ. 
Serv. 
Gen. pub. 
Serv. 
Recreat- 
-ion 
Expenditure 
SHARE 
0.022** 
(9.47) 
0.020** 
(4.92) 
0.001 
(0.80) 
0.009 
(1.56) 
-0.001 
(1.00) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
-0.005 
(1.35) 
-0.005** 
(2.86) 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
TOTAL 
Expenditure 
0.003 
(1.80) 
-0.014** 
(5.24) 
-0.006 
(1.90) 
-0.016** 
(6.09) 
-0.008 
(4.00) 
-0.004* 
(2.32) 
-0.014** 
(3.17) 
-0.011** 
(5.86) 
-0.007 
(1.99) 
Short run effects (average)         
Expenditure 
SHARE (1STdif) 
0.000 
(0.40) 
-0.001 
(1.29) 
0.000 
(0.22) 
-0.000 
(0.04) 
-0.001* 
(2.21) 
-0.001 
(0.61) 
0.001 
(0.67) 
0.000 
(0.38) 
0.005 
(1.23) 
Expenditure 
SHARE (2NDdif) 
0.001 
(1.08) 
-0.001 
(1.42) 
-0.000 
(0.10) 
-0.000 
(0.17) 
-0.000 
(0.63) 
0.001 
(1.44) 
0.001 
(1.37) 
0.001 
(1.47) 
-0.001 
(1.00) 
Notes: (1) All regressions in the Table take the same form as regression 2 in Table 1, augmented to include each 
individual expenditure share. That is,included variablesare total public expenditure; distortionary taxes & ‘other’ 
revenues; non-distortionary taxes; investment ratio; employment growth, lagged GDP per capita;excluded variableare 
Budget surplus.(2) t-statistics in parentheses below parameters; *, ** = significant at the 5%, 1% respectively. 
 
TABLE 4 
Testing public expenditure composition under alternative lag structures 
Regression: 1’ 2’ 3’ 4’ 5’ 6’ 7’ 8’ 9’ 
Share of: T&C Education 
 
Health Hous- 
ing 
Social 
welfare 
Defence Econ. 
Serv. 
Gen. pub. 
Serv. 
Recreat- 
-ion 
ARDL (2, 2) model 
Expenditure 
SHARE 
0.003** 
(2.58) 
0.004** 
(2.48) 
0.012** 
(3.64) 
0.037** 
(4.95) 
-0.008** 
(3.90) 
-0.007** 
(10.10) 
-0.001 
(0.37) 
0.013** 
(3.97) 
0.029* 
(2.12) 
TOTAL 
Expenditure 
-0.012** 
(7.19) 
-0.012** 
(6.65) 
-0.015** 
(5.66) 
-0.016** 
(4.81) 
-0.004 
(1.88) 
-0.002** 
(2.77) 
-0.014** 
(6.17) 
-0.003 
(0.74) 
-0.015** 
(7.19) 
ARDL (p, q) lag structure (p, m ≤ 2) chosen by Schwarz criterion (Table 3) 
Expenditure 
SHARE 
0.022** 
(9.47) 
0.020** 
(4.92) 
0.001 
(0.80) 
0.009 
(1.56) 
-0.001 
(1.00) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
-0.005 
(1.35) 
-0.005** 
(2.86) 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
TOTAL 
Expenditure 
0.003 
(1.80) 
-0.014** 
(5.24) 
-0.006 
(1.90) 
-0.016** 
(6.09) 
-0.008 
(4.00) 
-0.004* 
(2.32) 
-0.014** 
(3.17) 
-0.011** 
(5.86) 
-0.007 
(1.99) 
 
TABLE 5 
Weak exogeneity tests for fiscal and investment variables 
 Expenditure 
share 
Total 
expenditure 
Distortionary 
& other taxes 
Non-distortionary 
taxes 
Investment 
ratio 
Table 1: regression 2 - 
-0.928 
(0.99) 
0 countries 
-3.429 
(2.08)** 
2 countries 
-1.110 
(1.01) 
0 countries 
-0.868 
(0.74) 
2 countries 
Table 3 regressions:      
 
T&C 
1.747 
(2.46)** 
1 country 
0.522 
(0.21) 
2countries 
-2.911 
(1.99)** 
1 country 
0.714 
(0.55) 
1 country 
0.756 
(0.72) 
1 country 
 
Education 
 
-0.735 
(1.03) 
0 countries 
-2.382 
(2.04)** 
2 countries 
-1.790 
(1.79) 
1 country 
0.227 
(0.30) 
1 country 
-1.013 
(0.90) 
1 country 
 
Health 
-0.948 
(1.29) 
0 countries 
-3.901 
(2.71)*** 
2 countries 
-3.023 
(2.75)*** 
4 countries 
-1.002 
(1.59) 
4 countries 
1.589 
(1.56) 
2 countries 
 
Housing  
0.427 
(0.62) 
1 country 
-2.523 
(2.19)** 
0 countries 
-3.685 
(2.18)** 
1 country 
-1.675 
(1.40) 
1 country 
-0.046 
(0.06) 
0 countries 
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Social Welfare 
-0.435 
(0.12) 
4 countries 
-3.294 
(1.61) 
0 countries 
-1.356 
(1.40) 
1 country 
0.535 
(0.95) 
1 country 
-1.753 
(0.88) 
3 countries 
 
Defence 
0.179 
(0.20) 
1 country 
-0.482 
(0.21) 
2 countries 
-3.397 
(1.47) 
1 country 
-2.328 
(1.56) 
2 countries 
0.073 
(0.05) 
0 countries 
 
Economic 
Services 
-1.973 
(2.06)** 
2 countries 
-3.489 
(3.29)*** 
2 countries 
-2.270 
(2.57)** 
4 countries 
-0.651 
(1.38) 
1 country 
1.333 
(2.06)** 
3 countries 
 
General Public 
Services 
-0.669 
(0.54) 
1 country 
-3.402 
(1.94)* 
1 country 
-2.369 
(1.52) 
1 country  
-0.175 
(0.22) 
2 countries  
3.068 
(3.50)*** 
2 countries 
 
Recreation 
-0.124 
(0.80) 
1 country 
-3.189 
(2.46)*** 
1 country 
-2.782 
(2.52)*** 
3 countries 
-0.609 
(0.83) 
4 countries  
2.003 
(1.71) 
3 countries 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below parameters. . *,**, *** = significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% level. Terms 
such as “2 countries” refers to the number of country-specific weak exogeneity tests where weak exogeneity is 
rejected at the 5% level. 
 
 
FIGURE 1 
Growth effect of a 1 percentage point change in the expenditure mix (in year 0) 
 
Note: Based on the results from Table 3 
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Appendix A: The updated OECD dataset 
The dataset used in this paper builds on that used by Bleaney et al. (2001), who used GFS fiscal 
data, covering consolidated central government functions only, based on the 1986 GFS Manual 
classification of fiscal variables (labeled ‘old’ below). Like much National Accounting at that 
stage, these variables were measured based on a ‘cash’, as opposed to ‘accruals’, accounting 
method. We refer to this below as the ‘old’ classification. The 2001 GFS Manual introduced a 
‘new’ classification system (mainly involving the reclassifying of other expenditures into general 
public services, and separating environmental protection from housing; see Wickens 2002). In 
line with new National Accounting practice, the ‘new’ GFS is based on accruals accounting and 
so is not directly comparable with the original Bleaney et al. dataset. In addition GFS data for 
central government on a cash basis has not generally been updated beyond about 1999 or 2000 
for most countries in our sample. The most recent data available (typically updated to 2007 or 
2008), based on the new classification and accrual accounting, is available for central and general 
(central plus local) government but has only been back-dated to 1990. 
Annual differences between fiscal variables measured on cash or accrual bases can be quite 
substantial. For example, the financial year in which corporation tax (cash) payments are made 
in many OECD countries can be different by up to 2-3 years from the (accrual) accounting period 
to which the tax liability relates. As a result, up-dating our dataset beyond around 2000 requires 
a careful splicing of ‘old’ and ‘new’ data streams and is likely to involve a number of inaccuracies 
of unknown magnitude. 
The currently available data is, in summary:(i) the latest GFS data on a cash basis for central 
government to update Bleaney et al.(typically to 1999 or 2000) and then (ii) the annual rate of 
change in ‘new’ fiscal variables for central government to update the series to the latest possible 
year. In some cases, where overlaps in the series suggest that the new and old GFSY do not 
correspond well, we supplement this with OECD sourced data which is based on a similar 
definition to the new GFS. Though in principle we would prefer to use a dataset capturing all 
levels of government, the unavailability of data on this basis prior to 1990 or 1995 would leave 
us with insufficient time-series observations. The updated dataset includes data from the early 
1970s to 2007 or 2008 for 17 countries: Australia, Austria, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Iceland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, 
UK, USA. Other OECD countries are excluded due to gaps in their data series, usually for fiscal 
variables. For example, Central and Eastern European Countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, 
Poland and Slovak Republic) provide data starting only in the mid-nineties. The rest of the 
excluded OECD countries have missing values for several mid-series years: Belgium (1989-95), 
Greece (1982-91), Ireland (1970-81), Italy (1989-95), Mexico (1972-79; 2001 onwards), 
Portugal (1989-97) and Switzerland (1985-1990). Japan only has only data for 1990-93; 1995-
98 and 2001-05. 
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Appendix B: Additional results 
 
APPENDIX TABLE B1 
Mean group parameter estimates for total public expenditure by country 
Country Parameter 
(t-value) 
Country Parameter 
(t-value) 
Australia 0.073 
(0.94) 
Norway -0.012 
(5.01)** 
Austria -0.021 
(2.22) 
Spain -0.002 
(0.16) 
Canada 0.011 
(1.04) 
Sweden -0.198 
(0.12) 
Denmark 0.019 
(4.70)** 
Turkey -0.019 
(2.88)** 
Finland -0.005 
(1.99)* 
United Kingdom 0.003 
(1.75) 
France -0.024 
(2.34)* 
United States -0.005 
(0.93) 
Iceland -0.001 
(0.14) 
Germany -0.009 
(0.10) 
Luxembourg -0.009 
(0.78) 
New Zealand -0.058 
(0.54) 
Netherlands -0.012 
(2.28)* 
  
Mean long run 
-0.020 
(1.65) 
  
Median long run -0.009   
Mean short run 
(1st Difference) 
-0.001 
(0.90) 
  
Median short run 
(1st Difference) 
0.000 
  
Mean short run 
(2nd Difference) 
0.000 
(0.20) 
  
Median short run 
(2nd Difference) 
0.000 
  
Observations 590   
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses; * and** = significant at the 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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APPENDIX TABLE B2 
Testing public expenditure composition: comparing regression methods 
Regression: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
Share of: T&C Educat- 
ion 
Health Hous- 
ing 
Social 
welfare 
Defence Econ. 
services 
Gen pub. 
services 
Recreat- 
ion 
Pooled Mean Group          
Expenditure 
share 
0.022** 
(9.47) 
0.020** 
(4.92) 
0.001 
(0.80) 
0.009 
(1.56) 
-0.001 
(1.00) 
-0.001 
(0.57) 
-0.005 
(1.35) 
-0.005** 
(2.86) 
-0.005 
(0.30) 
Total 
expenditure 
0.003 
(1.80) 
-0.014** 
(5.24) 
-0.006 
(1.90) 
-0.016** 
(6.09) 
-0.008 
(4.00) 
-0.004* 
(2.32) 
-0.014** 
(3.17) 
-0.011** 
(5.86) 
-0.007 
(1.99) 
Dynamic Fixed Effects          
Expenditure -0.001 -0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.002 -0.006 -0.000 -0.003 0.004 
share (0.15) (0.35) (0.97) (0.63) (0.94) (0.97) (0.07) (1.10) (0.21) 
Total 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
expenditure (0.23) (0.49) (0.46) (0.24) (0.34) (0.53) (0.37) (0.39) (0.42) 
Mean Group          
Expenditure -0.084 -0.029 0.019 -0.040 0.105 -0.040 -0.006 -0.008 -0.732 
share (0.89) (0.88) (0.78) (1.44) (0.94) (1.32) (0.63) (1.19) (0.87) 
Total -0.052 -0.026 -0.016 0.015 -0.285 -0.022 -0.001 -0.011 -0.012 
expenditure (1.00) (1.75) (1.44) (0.76) (1.06) (1.48) (0.07) (1.49) (1.16) 
Hausman tests: 
MG versus PMG 
Expenditure 
share 
χ2(1) 1.24     
p 0.27 
χ2(1) 2.23     
p 0.14 
χ2(1) 0.53     
p 0.47 
χ2(1) 3.28     
p 0.07 
χ2(1) 0.90     
p 0.34 
χ2(1) 1.69     
p 0.19 
χ2(1) 0.01     
p 0.92 
χ2(1) 0.20     
p 0.65 
χ2(1) 0.75     
p 0.39 
Total 
expenditure 
χ2(1) 1.12     
p 0.29 
χ2(1) 0.64     
p 0.42 
χ2(1) 0.85     
p 0.36 
χ2(1) 2.57     
p 0.11 
χ2(1) 1.06     
p 0.30 
χ2(1) 1.54     
p 0.21 
χ2(1) 6.12     
p 0.01 
χ2(1) 0.01     
p 0.92 
χ2(1) 0.31     
p 0.58 
All variables  χ2(6) 7.14 
p 0.31 
χ2(6) 6.97 
p 0.32 
χ2(6) 5.79 
p 0.45 
χ2(6) 7.50 
p 0.28 
χ2(6) 7.09 
p 0.31 
χ2(6) 8.73 
p 0.19 
χ2(6) 5.93 
p 0.43 
χ2(6) 4.88 
p 0.56 
χ2(6) 6.40 
p 0.38 
PMG versus DFE 
All variables 
PMG v DFE 
χ2(6) 45.5 
p 0.00 
χ2(6) 53.2 
p 0.00 
χ2(6) 51.2 
p 0.00 
χ2(6) 58.3 
p 0.00 
χ2(6) 18.1 
p 0.01 
χ2(6) 42.51 
p 0.00 
χ2(6) 14.4 
p 0.03 
χ2(6) 17.4 
p 0.01 
χ2(6) 55.9 
p 0.00 
Notes: (1) All regressions take the same form as regression 3 in Table 1, augmented to include each individual expenditure 
share. That is,included variables = total public expenditure; distortionary; non-distortionary taxes; investment 
ratio; employment growth, lagged residual;excluded variable = Budget surplus.(2) p = p-value; t-statistics in 
parentheses below parameters; *, ** = significant at the 5%, 1% respectively. All coefficients are estimated 
long-run effects 
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APPENDIX TABLE B3 
Panel Unit Root Tests 
 Harris-Tzavalis (1999) Breitung (2000) Pesaran (2007) 
(H0: Panels contain unit roots;  Ha: Panels are stationary) 
Distortionary 
taxes 
ρ   0.9860 
p-value 1.000 
λ      -1.0962 
p-value 0.136 
Ztbar   -0.495 
p-value 0.310 
Investment 
ρ   0.9141 
p-value 0.999 
λ      0.2616 
p-value 0.603 
Ztbar   -0.860 
p-value 0.195 
Total spending 
ρ   0.9891 
p-value 1.000 
λ      -0.1800 
p-value 0.428 
Ztbar   2.251 
p-value 0.988 
Non-distortionary 
taxes 
ρ   0.9950 
p-value 1.000 
λ      -1.1298 
p-value 0.129 
Ztbar   0.619 
p-value 0.732 
Deficit 
ρ   0.7803 
p-value 0.000 
λ      -3.0396 
p-value 0.001 
Ztbar   -0.721 
p-value 0.236 
Log of GDP per 
capita 
 ρ   1.0064 
p-value 1.000 
λ      -0.9136 
p-value 0.180 
Ztbar   -0.929 
p-value 0.176 
Employment 
growth 
ρ   0.2723 
p-value 0.000 
λ     -3.7036 
p-value 0.000 
Ztbar   -6.365 
p-value 0.000 
T&C 
ρ   0.9477 
p-value 1.000 
λ     0.1201 
p-value 0.547 
Ztbar   0.634 
p-value 0.737 
Education 
ρ   0.9956 
p-value 1.000 
λ     -0.6984 
p-value 0.242 
Ztbar   -0.496 
p-value 0.310 
Health 
ρ   0.9977 
p-value 1.000 
λ     -0.3194 
p-value 0.374 
Ztbar   2.840 
p-value 0.998 
Housing 
ρ   0.8981 
p-value 0.999 
λ     -1.8060 
p-value 0.036 
Ztbar   1.201 
p-value 0.885 
Social Welfare 
ρ   0.9823 
p-value 1.000 
λ     -0.4212 
p-value 0.336 
Ztbar   0.883 
p-value 0.811 
Defence 
ρ   0.9857 
p-value 1.000 
λ     -0.9910 
p-value 0.161 
Ztbar   -3.178 
p-value 0.001 
Economic 
Services 
ρ   0.9288 
p-value 1.000 
λ     -2.0372 
p-value 0.021 
Ztbar   1.893 
p-value 0.971 
Gen pub. 
Services 
ρ   0.9439 
p-value 1.000 
λ     -0.9533 
p-value 0.170 
Ztbar   -0.074 
p-value 0.471 
Recreation 
ρ   1.0101 
p-value 1.000 
λ     1.4533 
p-value 0.926 
Ztbar   2.234 
p-value 0.987 
 
Cointegration Tests  
Test Robust p-value for GDP, fiscal 
variables and investment 
Robust p-value among regressors 
(fiscal variables and investment) 
Pt 0.02 0.60 
Pa 0.13 0.93 
Cointegration test for Estimation 1.2 in Table1 
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APPENDIX TABLE B4 
Weak exogeneity tests for ARDL (2,2) model 
 Expenditure 
share 
Total 
expenditure 
Distortionary 
& other taxes 
Non-distortionary 
taxes 
Investment 
ratio 
 
Estimation 1.2 
 -1.083 
(1.33) 
0 countries 
1.751 
(1.05) 
2 countries 
1.411 
(3.01)** 
0 countries 
0.100 
(0.09) 
1 country 
 
T&C 
-1.986 
(1.02) 
2 countries 
4.097 
(0.89) 
1country 
-0.100 
(0.04) 
2 countries 
1.600 
(1.36) 
1 country 
1.449 
(0.81) 
1 country 
 
Education 
 
-0.797 
(1.33) 
0 countries 
-1.145 
(0.76) 
2 countries 
0.637 
(0.42) 
1 country 
3.156 
(1.67) 
4 countries 
0.392 
(0.45) 
1 country 
 
Health 
2.713 
(1.86) 
0 countries 
-3.202 
(1.61) 
1 country 
-1.348 
(1.13) 
2 countries 
0.884 
(0.62) 
2 countries 
0.064 
(0.05) 
3 countries 
 
Housing  
-1.851 
(1.70) 
3 countries 
0.653 
(0.32) 
2 countries 
1.897 
(1.50) 
3 countries 
1.759 
(2.39)* 
3 countries 
2.562 
(2.03)* 
2 countries 
 
Social Welfare 
-7.567 
(1.91) 
3 countries 
1.239 
(0.54) 
2 countries 
-0.070 
(0.08) 
0 countries 
0.420 
(0.53) 
2 countries 
2.429 
(1.66) 
1 country 
 
Defence 
-1.128 
(2.49)* 
1 country 
1.275 
(1.45) 
2 countries 
-1.185 
(1.46) 
4 countries 
0.319 
(0.51) 
3 countries 
-0.340 
(0.54) 
0 countries 
 
Economic 
Services 
5.117 
(1.88) 
2 countries 
-1.873 
(0.60) 
0 countries 
0.831 
(0.54) 
2 countries 
3.001 
(3.12)* 
2 countries 
1.553 
(0.86) 
1 country 
 
General Public 
Services 
-5.981 
(0.75) 
2 countries 
-1.720 
(0.56) 
0 countries 
3.691 
(1.43) 
1 country  
-3.292 
(1.13) 
0 countries  
1.868 
(2.60)* 
0 countries 
 
Recreation 
-0.153 
(0.28) 
0 countries 
2.462 
(0.69) 
0 countries 
0.701 
(0.48) 
2 countries 
1.852 
(1.21) 
3 countries  
0.849 
(0.87) 
1 country 
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses below parameters. * = significant at the 5% level. Terms such as “2 countries” 
refers to the number of country-specific weak exogeneity tests where weak exogeneity is rejected at the 5% level. 
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